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UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS IN THE LOCAL PUBLIC SAFETY 
ENVINRONMENT: A REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) – also called “unmanned aerial vehicles” (UAVs) or “remotely 
piloted aircrafts” (RPAs) – refer to a widely divergent range of aircraft capable of flight without 
an onboard crew (Elias & Flynn, 2015).  Variant types can be distinguished by rotary or fixed 
wing configurations, being heavier or lighter than air, and their size, payload, and duration of 
flight. Media have interchangeably used the term “drones” to describe any of these craft, often 
conjuring images of military weapon systems with comparatively advanced capabilities.  
However, the range of UAS models is decidedly vaster than the public realizes. 
An important distinction lies first in recognizing that the needs of the civil first responder 
community (local law enforcement, fire services, emergency medical services and emergency 
management) differ from those of the armed forces.  Military-grade weapons systems are far 
beyond the operational needs, fiscal capabilities, and ambitions of domestic agencies.  Still, 
public perception is decidedly mixed, and often confuses the very limited tactical usage of UAS 
envisioned by much of law enforcement and public safety with their larger, more powerful, 
weaponized military counterparts.  Still more confusion is created by fears of widespread 
“drone” use by civilian hobbyists, despite the fact that civilian systems would be much more 
limited in capability than that of public agencies (Table 1).  
Table 1: “Representative” Capabilities of Commercially-Offered UAS  
UAS Types Flight 
Duration 
Payload Speed Altitude Initial Cost 
Hobbyist Short None to a 
few pounds 
~30 mph 150+ feet   $50 and up 
Public safety < 45 minutes   < 30 pounds 30-80 mph < 12,000 feet $35-$400K 
Military 24+ hours 3750 pounds 300-500 mph > 50,000 feet $30,000K+ 
This paper reviews the basic characteristics and capabilities of UAS and the potential that they 
bring in improving first responder operations. It is important to note at the outset, however, that, 
from a practical standpoint, the regulatory regime and restrictions on UAS flight are already 
quite constraining.  Restrictions on flight altitude and proximity to people, as well as concerns 
regarding the potential interference with aviation, limit the utility of UAS to a set of very 
narrowly limited and well-defined circumstances.  Unfortunately, this also means that UAS are 
likely to remain primarily a suburban and rural phenomenon for the near future.1 
                                                          
1 As an example, regulations do not permit, nor has public testing been done of, UAS operating in urban areas at 
altitudes that would place them in close proximity to buildings and people. 
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Other limitations arise both from current operational and technological shortcomings existing in 
the technology at present.  For instance, the use of drones by the fire service for aerial views of 
structure fires offers only limited promise due to the fact that their deployment lags in time 
relative to fire service response units.  Additionally, aerial views of a fire scene likely contribute 
little to enhanced effectiveness or improved outcomes.  Thus, here is one example where UAS 
would be of limited use, deployed only for well-developed structural fires for which an exterior 
attack regime is in place and the structure is “written off.”  However, even here, UAS could offer 
potential advantages in assisting incident managers in scene surveillance and communication.  
An additional need that has not been recognized is the challenge of developing policy guidance 
and understanding the circumstances in which UAS can offer advantages over existing means for 
gathering situational awareness. While examples of UAS deployment in law enforcement tactical 
situations with barricaded or concealed subjects are intuitive, this conclusion is supported by 
anecdotal evidence for their effectiveness in enhancing officer safety. Additional documentation 
and an understanding of limitations and operating guidelines are necessary before widespread 
adoption for this purpose is recommended.  Operational plans will also need to consider the 
hostile use of UAS by adversaries to surveil law enforcement and disrupt the tactical balance in 
active shooter, barricaded subject, or civil disturbance scenarios. 
UAS will continue to grow in popularity inside and outside of government.  What follows is a 
brief review of these domains, with an emphasis on the types, legal constraints, and policy 
concerns with their generalized use.  
2. Market for Unmanned Aerial Systems 
UAS have been used by the United States military as far back as the 1960s to avoid the risk of 
fatality incurred from using human pilots in hostile territories (Sherwood, 2012).  Today, the 
United States Armed Forces continue to use UAS for reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeted 
missile strikes (see Wilner, 2015).  However, while the military continues to be the major user of 
unmanned aerial technology, slowly but surely the utility of UAS in other contexts is being 
recognized (Elias & Flynn, 2015).  One notable instance is the use by the U. S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) of Predator drones to patrol the U. S.-Mexican border (Gann, 2012) 
or by private news agencies in what is called “drone journalism” (Corcoran, 2014).  
Opportunities to expand the use of UAS have been increasingly touted, with drone technology 
beginning to enter into the arenas of local government, commercial enterprises and personal-use 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2012).   
3. UAS in Public Safety 
One of the most important sectors in which UAS use is burgeoning is in local law enforcement 
and emergency response.  As they are frequently placed in imminent danger, police, firefighters 
and other emergency responders are drawn to UAS out of considerations primarily of safety, 
affordability, and flexibility in use and capabilities (Gann, 2012).  Public safety agencies may 
use UAS for a number of activities, including search and rescue, aerial views of emergency 
incident scenes, hazardous materials exposures, natural disasters, tool transfer and exchange, 
initial medical assessment, hostage situation surveillance, traffic accident and crime scene 
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photography, and environmental regulation (Gann, 2012; Abrahamsen, 2015; Elias & Flynn, 
2015).   
Examples of successful UAS use in real-world emergencies are beginning to accrue, 
demonstrating their usefulness in saving crucial time and resources and preventing risk to human 
lives (Sherwood, 2012).  While Abrahamsen (2015) demonstrated the use of UAS in delivering 
tools in a controlled demonstration, in a live situation, a fire chief in Mechanic Falls, ME, 
delivered a life vest to a stranded adolescent whose river tube had overturned in the midst of the 
Little Androscoggin River (McFarland, 2015).  The year before, footage providing an aerial, 
tactical view at the scene of a large fire was released by Firegroundimages.com (Fire 
Engineering, 2014; Firegroundimages.com, 2014).  There are many other, similar examples of 
UAS providing dividends in emergency situations in recent years (Elias & Flynn, 2015).  Taken 
together, these support the need for a close look into the adoption of these systems more widely. 
The size and capabilities of UAS systems vary greatly.  From one extreme, there are 
multimillion-dollar drone systems that can be armed and controlled with computer aviation 
systems thousands of miles away; on the other hand, small cell phone-sized systems with no 
payload capabilities and extremely limited ranges for remote control are also available (Gann, 
2012).  Law enforcement and emergency response agencies most often seek systems whose costs 
and capabilities lie somewhere in the middle.  Military-style UAS have historically been too 
large, impractically complex, and prohibitively expensive for domestic safety uses.  For example, 
the Predator drone weighs over 32,000 pounds and can have an array of gadgetry, including high 
performance imagining devices and complex sensors. UAS envisioned for local or state 
government use would be much smaller, lighter, and have greatly limited capability in terms of 
payload, flying time, and technological enhancements.  Expensive components – such as thermal 
imaging and advanced audio systems – are plausible, but not practical or warranted for use by 
municipal enforcement and emergency response agencies (Gann, 2012).   
To complete the tasks for which UAS are used in public safety, typically the use of small, 
simplistic vehicles will suffice, with considerations regarding whether to purchase fixed-winged 
or rotary drones being much more relevant than whether to include more complex technology.2  
Simple HD cameras with basic real-time video streams or high-resolution pictures are much 
more feasible than sophisticated imagery or sensory capacity (Gann, 2012).  This is an important 
point, as distinguishing small public safety UAS from those larger, more sophisticated models 
used by the U. S. military will do much to reduce the anxieties of the public about overly 
aggressive capacities and allay the fears of local administrators about the cost and usability of 
these smaller systems. 
The benefits of UAS in public safety can, at the outset, be quantified in the reduction of risk to 
human life or bodily injury; this alone warrants meaningful reflection by local administrators of 
the need to incorporate these systems into their law enforcement and public safety operations.  
The case is bolstered tremendously, however, when it is understood that the systems most 
appropriate for civil use are, in fact, much less expensive and far less intrusive than what is 
                                                          
2 Regarding the wing selection debate, it should be noted that expected function is key: Fixed-winged systems have 
the advantage of gliding to conserve fuel, while rotary-winged systems can hover over a desired location (Gann, 
2012). 
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commonly imagined based on military models.  As discussed, several public safety 
organizations, as well as other industries, private and public, have already recognized this 
potential and developers are currently improving the technology, adding a wide range of 
capabilities, and increasing flexibility, affordability, and safety (Elias & Flynn, 2015). 
Common UAS Uses by State and Local Government 
The following are the most common situations in which UAS are deployed by state and local 
governments: 
A) Border security and surveillance – Similar to the border patrol done by the DHS, border 
states and their city governments may use UAS to secure local border areas and provide 
aerial oversight for other restricted regions. 
B) Disaster site reconnaissance and mapping – Emergency agencies can utilize streaming or 
captured aerial views of various disasters sites that are either too dangerous for first 
responders to enter or too large to survey in a feasible amount of time. 
C) Alternative to existing manned operations – Piloted aircraft can be replaced or assisted by 
UAS, providing an affordable, low maintenance, and low-risk option. This can be appealing 
for reasons of cost and safety. 
D) Research/wildlife – UAS may be powered using clean, unobtrusive energy sources.  This 
can be beneficial for operations, like wildlife surveying, in which human presence or 
pollutant emissions could be disturbing or harmful (Federal Aviation Administration, 2012). 
 
4. Federal Regulation of UAS 
The federal government has the “exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States” (49 U.S. 
Code §40103), meaning that “no person may operate a UAS in the [National Airspace System 
(NAS)] without specific authority” (Federal Aviation Administration, N JO 7210.873).  
Surprisingly, however, there are no substantive regulations for UAS.  Mostly restricted to 
specific emergency operations by public agencies, UAS use is subject to ad hoc approval through 
a certificate of waiver or authorization process conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA). 
Early on, this process lacked organization and was slow to grant public entities authorization.  To 
fix this, the FAA, along with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and 
the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Homeland Security (DHS), formed an executive 
committee to address UAS integration issues (Federal Avaiation Administration, 2012).  As of 
March 2012, the FAA has streamlined the process somewhat, taking anywhere from 60 days for 
non-emergency approvals to a few hours in emergency situations, and the agency has extended 
the period of authorization granted from 12 months to 24 months (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2015).   
Despite the availability of permitting processes, public entities that are granted a certificate of 
authorization (COA) still face heavy restrictions.  No flight in the airspace around the busiest 
airports are authorized, systems are often required to be flown in eye sight of their operators, and 
coordination must be planned with air traffic controllers in some airspaces (Federal Avaition 
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Administration, 2012).  Still, the list of agencies applying for COAs is growing.  In 2009, only 
146 agencies nationwide had successfully applied for a COA; as of December 2014, 609 
agencies were granted a COA by the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration, 2015).   
It has also become impossible for the FAA to ignore the commercial and civilian markets’ 
interest in the acquisition and use of UAS in the national airspace.  However, the FAA maintains 
that “operations in civil airspace have different priorities [from those in the defense sector]. Civil 
performance standards are often more stringent, especially in the areas of reliability” (Federal 
Avaition Administration, 2012).  This stance portends strict regulations for non-federal, and 
especially private, UAS use for the foreseeable future. 
4. UAS and Civil Liberties 
A key issue in debate and deliberation regarding the use of UAS concerns citizen privacy. 
Citizens and lawmakers alike have made it clear that the increased surveillance capabilities UAS 
grant their users continue to be a source of concern.  With the prospect of both civilian and 
public UAS taking flight in the airspace, civilians will now face a new privacy concern.  For 
example, lawmakers have already begun to question the legal implications of UAS flight above 
private property (Gann, 2012).  In such instances, it is an open question whether these situations 
constitute trespassing by private persons or a breach of Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.   
Several state representatives have drafted legislation against the use of UAS.  In fact, at least 
twenty states currently have legislation restricting the use of UAS (Elias & Flynn, 2015).  
Federally, in the 113th Congress, U. S. Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) proposed that UAS operations 
funded or undertaken under the authority of the federal government be prohibited unless a 
warrant is obtained that meets constitutional muster (The Library of Congress, 2012).  This 
initial effort was followed in the 114th Congress by representatives proposing at least seven 
additional bills regulating UAS (Elias & Flynn, 2015).  In a report addressing the growing use of 
UAS, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) referenced existing case law concerning private 
property and the airspace above it.  Previous Supreme Court jurisprudence has declared the 
airspace above property, both public and private, to be public space (United States v. Causby, 
328 U.S. 256 (1946); Thompson, 2013).  If the Causby precedent provides the bounds of 
intrusion by UAS, limits to such systems may be greatly reduced from those desired by the 
public.   
Seemingly as an answer to these perceived liberty threats, organizations such as the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (EFF) have arisen to provide civilian oversight of the deployment of UAS 
(Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2012).  The EFF’s Transparency Project has filed numerous 
lawsuits against the Department of Transportation (DOT) to obtain information from the FAA 
regarding who they had granted COAs to and the purpose of these certificates, which the EFF 
claims had not been previously available to the public.  Public backlash against the use of the 
UAS has come to such a level that public officials have pulled the technology from use in their 
municipalities.  The Seattle Police Department’s ban on the use of their UAS is an example of 
the public’s increased concern for their privacy.  On February 7, 2013, the Seattle mayor ordered 
the police department to discontinue the use of their UAS and to return it to its vendor (The 
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Associated Press, 2013).  Despite police claims that the UAS was only for specialized tasks such 
as surveying crime scenes and major disasters, residents felt police resources should be used for 
community building work instead of on potentially intrusive technologies.   
At present, the FAA has still not issued permanent regulations for the use of UAS.  As of this 
writing, the published interim guidance on UAS policy has been extended to July 2016.  Thus, a 
firm federal stance on civil liberty by the executive branch is still pending, not to speak of 
inaction in the legislature and judiciary.  UAS provides simply another example the nation’s laws 
failing to keep track with technological advancements. 
5. Operational Limitations of UAS 
UAS, like any technology, have limitations. While some of these limitations are due to the 
physical capability and the surrounding environment, some noted limitations are matters of 
security and safety from external sources (Federal Aviation Administration, 2012; Elias & Flynn, 
2015): 
A) Technological limitations: Current models of UAS to be used in public safety operations 
are limited, to some degree, by the payload they can carry, including battery size and, 
therefore, battery life.  They also typically generate at least some ambient noise.  The 
limited scope of view transmitted to the operator creates the potential for missing safety 
threats approaching lateral or anterior to the aircraft.  Finally, a substantial degree of 
training is required to operate these systems. 
B) Operation in inclement weather conditions:  The decreased size of domestic UAS may 
have an advantage in manufacturing expenses and maneuverability, but it poses a 
problem when vehicles are subjected to harsh weather conditions.  Strong winds that 
would not affect full size aircrafts can render some UAS inoperable. Even humidity and 
precipitation can pose a problem for UAS, which rely heavily on electronic systems to 
operate. 
C) Airspace:  Currently, the FAA mandates that no UAS is permitted to enter commercial 
airspace, regardless of whether it is controlled by an authorized public or private entity. 
This is a major restriction, as commercial airspace comprises a substantial proportion of 
the National Airspace System (NAS).  Restriction from commercial airspace makes UAS 
impossible in many major cities and heavily populated areas, usually classified as 
commercial air space due to local airports. 
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D)  
Source: (Federal Aviation Administration) 
E) Tall structures:  Because of concerns for safety and collision avoidance, the COA’s given 
by the FAA mandate the use of UAS in line of site by the operator.  Tall structures pose a 
problem in complying with this mandate, as operators are unable to keep sight of their 
UAS.  These structures also act as obstacles in which a collision can occur. 
F) Time:  Flight during night times or low visibility conditions will not permit operators to 
keep a visual contact with their aircraft.  Since COA’s mandate UAS be operated in 
visual range of the operator, this also substantially limits the practicality of their use. 
The limitations of tall buildings and commercial airspace pose serious limitations to UAS for 
usage in densely-built urban areas.  
6. Moving Forward 
UAS faces an uncertain future in domestic markets, with challenges ranging from lack of 
regulation or vague standards, legal and constitutional adversity, and operational limitations.  
Additionally, UAS faces issues in the form of both security concerns and public education.  UAS 
rely not only on hardware, but also software to operate.  They are, therefore, susceptible to 
malicious programming through hacking, providing an unauthorized user control of the system.   
The possibility of UAS being hacked poses a particularly grave threat to the public’s privacy and 
physical safety.  Professor Todd Humphreys of the University of Texas demonstrated as much 
after his team hacked and gained control of the navigational signals of an unmanned aerial 
vehicle several kilometers away (Sherwood, 2012).  This is a critical concern to law enforcement 
agencies, which use UAS to conduct sensitive missions that criminal offenders might interfere 
with.  Moreover, detection of malicious unmanned aircraft would still be quite limited with the 
resources available to most local law enforcement today (Elias & Flynn, 2015). 
Public education and transparency are still another challenge that must be faced.  Public fears 
have already been awakened about the current use of UAS technology and apprehension about 
more expansive use in the future has only made them worst.  Agencies and organizations that use 
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UAS must communicate their intended usage and purpose, and the public must be alerted to the 
difference between domestic and military systems.  The FAA has a huge role in ensuring 
regulation is kept current and transparent.  As more becomes known about UAS technology, 
better regulation and controls can be identified and created. Development of technologies for 
“counter-UAS” may well outpace widespread positive use of UAS by public safety. 
7. Conclusion 
UAS gained their reputation largely in military application. Hobbyists’ use of small UAS outside 
or contrary to regulation has garnered considerable attention, catapulting the fear of widespread 
use of “drones” into the public dialogue.  It is imperative that distinctions be made between the 
military use of UAS, that of civilian hobbyists, and UAS use by local agencies in the execution 
of their public safety missions.  An emphasis on the limited capacity of public domestic UAS 
should de-intensify concerns over privacy and security violations among the public, while an 
emphasis on the benefits of public domestic UAS should support the case for allowing their 
greater use, even amid stricter regulations on their use in the private sphere.  Most importantly, 
public education must center on illuminating the various uses of UAS technology and combat 
dread of a weaponized police “drone” so predominant in public discourse (see Eidam, 2015). 
The use of UAS for mission-critical public safety applications is surely approaching (Elias & 
Flynn, 2015), but generalized use remains limited.  Tactical deployment of UAS shows promise 
in law enforcement, but more generalized usage remains aspirational.  
Development of policy, capture of data on effectiveness, and evaluation of outcomes are 
necessary to permit further adoption. Technological innovation is expanding rapidly, and new 
capabilities may emerge for public safety. Autonomous systems are a particular trend that may 
alter the efficacy of UAS for public safety. 
Fears and misunderstandings by both the general public and local policymakers pose real limits 
to adoption of UAS technology into state and local public safety systems.  By outlining the 
limitations of this technology, the gaps in understanding and harnessing its potential, and the 
legitimate points of concern in its use, this report addresses this informational void.  Still, much 
more needs to be done in research, policy and public educational arenas in order to fully realize 
the benefits of this technology.  
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Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are aircraft subject to regulation by the FAA to ensure safety 
of flight, and safety of people and property on the ground.  States and local jurisdictions are 
increasingly exploring regulation of UAS or proceeding to enact legislation relating to UAS 
operations.  In 2015, approximately 45 states have considered restrictions on UAS.  In addition, 
public comments on the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) proposed rule, “Operation and 
Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems” (Docket No. FAA-2015-0150), expressed 
concern about the possible impact of state and local laws on UAS operations.   
 
Incidents involving unauthorized and unsafe use of small, remote-controlled aircraft have risen 
dramatically.  Pilot reports of interactions with suspected unmanned aircraft have increased from 
238 sightings in all of 2014 to 780 through August of this year.  During this past summer, the 
presence of multiple UAS in the vicinity of wild fires in the western U.S. prompted firefighters 
to ground their aircraft on several occasions. 
 
This fact sheet is intended to provide basic information about the federal regulatory framework 
for use by states and localities when considering laws affecting UAS. State and local restrictions 
affecting UAS operations should be consistent with the extensive federal statutory and regulatory 
framework pertaining to control of the airspace, flight management and efficiency, air traffic 
control, aviation safety, navigational facilities, and the regulation of aircraft noise at its source.   
 
Presented below are general principles of federal law as they relate to aviation safety, and 
examples of state and local laws that should be carefully considered prior to any legislative 
action to ensure that they are consistent with applicable federal safety regulations.  The FAA’s 
Office of the Chief Counsel is available for consultation on specific questions. 
 
WHY THE FEDERAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Congress has vested the FAA with authority to regulate the areas of airspace use, management 
and efficiency, air traffic control, safety, navigational facilities, and aircraft noise at its source.  
49 U.S.C. §§ 40103, 44502, and 44701-44735.  Congress has directed the FAA to “develop plans 
and policy for the use of the navigable airspace and assign by regulation or order the use of the 
airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace.”  49 U.S.C. 
§ 40103(b)(1).  Congress has further directed the FAA to “prescribe air traffic regulations on the 
flight of aircraft (including regulations on safe altitudes)” for navigating, protecting, and 






airspace efficiently; and preventing collision between aircraft, between aircraft and land or water 
vehicles, and between aircraft and airborne objects.  49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(2).   
 
A consistent regulatory system for aircraft and use of airspace has the broader effect of ensuring 
the highest level of safety for all aviation operations.  To ensure the maintenance of a safe and 
sound air transportation system and of navigable airspace free from inconsistent restrictions, 
FAA has regulatory authority over matters pertaining to aviation safety.  
 
REGULATING UAS OPERATIONS 
 
In § 333 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (Public Law No. 112-95), Congress 
directed the Secretary to determine whether UAS operations posing the least amount of public 
risk and no threat to national security could safely be operated in the national airspace system 
(NAS) and if so, to establish requirements for the safe operation of these systems in the NAS. 
 
On February 15, 2015, the FAA proposed a framework of regulations that would allow routine 
commercial use of certain small UAS in today’s aviation system, while maintaining flexibility to 
accommodate future technological innovations.  The FAA’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
offered safety rules for small UAS (under 55 pounds) conducting non-recreational or non-hobby 
operations. The proposed rule defines permissible hours of flight, line-of-sight observation, 
altitude, operator certification, optional use of visual observers, aircraft registration and marking, 
and operational limits.  
 
Consistent with its statutory authority, the FAA is requiring Federal registration of UAS in order 
to operate a UAS.  Registering UAS will help protect public safety in the air and on the ground, 
aid the FAA in the enforcement of safety-related requirements for the operation of UAS, and 
build a culture of accountability and responsibility among users operating in U.S. airspace.  No 
state or local UAS registration law may relieve a UAS owner or operator from complying with 
the Federal UAS registration requirements.  Because Federal registration is the exclusive means 
for registering UAS for purposes of operating an aircraft in navigable airspace, no state or local 
government may impose an additional registration requirement on the operation of UAS in 
navigable airspace without first obtaining FAA approval.  
 
Substantial air safety issues are raised when state or local governments attempt to regulate the 
operation or flight of aircraft.  If one or two municipalities enacted ordinances regulating UAS in 
the navigable airspace and a significant number of municipalities followed suit, fractionalized 
control of the navigable airspace could result.  In turn, this ‘patchwork quilt’ of differing 
restrictions could severely limit the flexibility of FAA in controlling the airspace and flight 
patterns, and ensuring safety and an efficient air traffic flow.  A navigable airspace free from 
inconsistent state and local restrictions is essential to the maintenance of a safe and sound air 
transportation system.  See Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir. 2007),	and	French 
v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Arizona v. U.S., 567 U.S. ___, 132 
S.Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012) (“Where Congress occupies an entire field . . . even complimentary state 
regulation is impermissible.  Field preemption reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any 
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state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to federal standards.”), and Morales v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1992).   
 
 
EXAMPLES OF STATE AND LOCAL LAWS FOR WHICH CONSULTATION WITH 
THE FAA IS RECOMMENDED 
 
• Operational UAS restrictions on flight altitude, flight paths; operational bans; any regulation 
of the navigable airspace.  For example – a city ordinance banning anyone from operating 
UAS within the city limits, within the airspace of the city, or within certain distances of 
landmarks.  Federal courts strictly scrutinize state and local regulation of  overflight.  City of 
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Skysign International, Inc. v. City 
and County of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2002); American Airlines v. Town of 
Hempstead, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968); American Airlines v. City of Audubon Park, 407 
F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1969).    
• Mandating equipment or training for UAS related to aviation safety such as geo-fencing 
would likely be preempted.  Courts have found that state regulation pertaining to mandatory 
training and equipment requirements related to aviation safety is not consistent with the 
federal regulatory framework.  Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton, 581 F. Supp. 2d 721, 740 
(E.D.N.C. 2008); Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Robinson, 486 F. Supp. 2d 713, 722 (M.D. Tenn. 
2007).  
 
EXAMPLES OF STATE AND LOCAL LAWS WITHIN STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT POLICE POWER 
 
Laws traditionally related to state and local police power – including land use, zoning, privacy, 
trespass, and law enforcement operations – generally are not subject to federal regulation.  
Skysign International, Inc. v. City and County of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2002).  
Examples include: 
 
• Requirement for police to obtain a warrant prior to using a UAS for surveillance. 
• Specifying that UAS may not be used for voyeurism. 
• Prohibitions on using UAS for hunting or fishing, or to interfere with or harass an individual 
who is hunting or fishing. 
• Prohibitions on attaching firearms or similar weapons to UAS. 
 
CONTACT INFORMATION FOR QUESTIONS 
 
The FAA’s Office of the Chief Counsel is available to answer questions about the principles set 
forth in this fact sheet and to consult with you about the intersection of federal, state, and local 
regulation of aviation, generally, and UAS operations, specifically.  You may contact the Office 
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• 49 U.S.C. §§ 40103, 44502, and 44701- 44735 (former Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as 
amended and recodified). 
 
•  FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Public Law No. 112-95 (Feb. 14, 2012), 




• Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 1. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court 
 
• “Congress has recognized the national responsibility for regulating air commerce. Federal 
control is intensive and exclusive. Planes do not wander about in the sky like vagrant 
clouds. They move only by federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in the hands 
of federally certified personnel and under an intricate system of federal commands. The 
moment a ship taxies onto a runway it is caught up in an elaborate and detailed system of 
controls. It takes off only by instruction from the control tower, it travels on prescribed 
beams, it may be diverted from its intended landing, and it obeys signals and orders. Its 
privileges, rights, and protection, so far as transit is concerned, it owes to the Federal 
Government alone and not to any state government.” Northwest Airlines v. State of 
Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944)(Jackson, R., concurring). 
 
• “If we were to uphold the Burbank ordinance [which placed an 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. curfew 
on jet flights from the Burbank Airport] and a significant number of municipalities 
followed suit, it is obvious that fractionalized control of the timing of takeoffs and 
landings would severely limit the flexibility of FAA in controlling air traffic flow.  The 
difficulties of scheduling flights to avoid congestion and the concomitant decrease in 
safety would be compounded.”  Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 
639 (1973).     
 
• “The Federal Aviation Act requires a delicate balance between safety and efficiency, and 
the protection of persons on the ground … The interdependence of these factors requires a 
uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation if the congressional objectives 
underlying the Federal Aviation Act are to be fulfilled.” Burbank at 638-639. 
 
• “The paramount substantive concerns of Congress [in enacting the FAA Act] were to 
regulate federally all aspects of air safety … and, once aircraft were in ‘flight,’ airspace 






U.S. Courts of Appeals 
 
• “Air traffic must be regulated at the national level. Without uniform equipment 
specifications, takeoff and landing rules, and safety standards, it would be impossible to 
operate a national air transportation system.” Gustafson v. City of Lake Angeles, 76 F.3d 
778, 792-793 (6th Cir. 1996)(Jones, N., concurring).   
 
• “The purpose, history, and language of the FAA [Act] lead us to conclude that Congress 
intended to have a single, uniform system for regulating aviation safety. The catalytic 
events leading to the enactment of the FAA [Act] helped generate this intent. The FAA 
[Act] was drafted in response to a series of fatal air crashes between civil and military 
aircraft operating under separate flight rules .… In discussing the impetus for the FAA 
[Act], the Supreme Court has also noted that regulating the aviation industry requires a 
delicate balance between safety and efficiency. It is precisely because of ‘the 
interdependence of these factors’ that Congress enacted ‘a uniform and exclusive system 
of federal regulation.’”  Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 471 (9th Cir. 2007), 
citing City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1973).   
 
• “[W]hen we look to the historical impetus for the FAA, its legislative history, and the 
language of the [FAA] Act, it is clear that Congress intended to invest the Administrator 
of the Federal Aviation Administration with the authority to enact exclusive air safety 
standards. Moreover, the Administrator has chosen to exercise this authority by issuing 
such pervasive regulations that we can infer a preemptive intent to displace all state law on 
the subject of air safety.” Montalvo at 472.   
 
• “We similarly hold that federal law occupies the entire field of aviation safety. Congress' 
intent to displace state law is implicit in the pervasiveness of the federal regulations, the 
dominance of the federal interest in this area, and the legislative goal of establishing a 
single, uniform system of control over air safety. This holding is fully consistent with our 
decision in Skysign International, Inc. v. Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2002), where 
we considered whether federal law preempted state regulation of aerial advertising that 
was distracting and potentially dangerous to persons on the ground. In upholding the state 
regulations, we held that federal law has not ‘preempt[ed] altogether any state regulation 
purporting to reach into the navigable airspace.’ Skysign at 1116. While Congress may not 
have acted to occupy exclusively all of air commerce, it has clearly indicated its intent to 
be the sole regulator of aviation safety.  The FAA, together with federal air safety 
regulations, establish complete and thorough safety standards for interstate and 
international air transportation that are not subject to supplementation by, or variation 
among, states.”  Montalvo at 473-474. 
 
• “[W]e remark the Supreme Court's reasoning regarding the need for uniformity 
[concerning] the regulation of aviation noise, see City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air 
Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973), and suggest that the same rationale applies here. In 
Burbank, the Court struck down a municipal anti-noise ordinance placing a curfew on jet 
flights from a regional airport.  Citing the ‘pervasive nature of the scheme of federal 
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regulation,’ the majority ruled that aircraft noise was wholly subject to federal hegemony, 
thereby preempting state or local enactments in the field. In our view, the pervasiveness of 
the federal web is as apparent in the matter of pilot qualification as in the matter of aircraft 
noise. If we upheld the Rhode Island statute as applied to airline pilots, ‘and a significant 
number of [states] followed suit, it is obvious that fractionalized control ... would severely 
limit the flexibility of the F.A.A ….’ [citing Burbank]  Moreover, a patchwork of state 
laws in this airspace, some in conflict with each other, would create a crazyquilt effect … 
The regulation of interstate flight-and flyers-must of necessity be monolithic. Its very 
nature permits no other conclusion. In the area of pilot fitness as in the area of aviation 
noise, the [FAA] Act as we read it ‘leave[s] no room for ... local controls.’ [citing 
Burbank].  French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1989).   
 
 
 
 
 
